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DISEC

Disarmament and International Security Committee

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

Freeze Date: 23 June 2026

AGENDA - Enhancing the Resilience of Global Supply Chains in an Era of Geopolitical and Climate Disruptions

LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Dear delegates,

We are pleased to welcome you to the Economic and Social Council Committee. We hope you have a rewarding and intellectually enhancing experience over the duration of this conference.

The agenda before you—Enhancing the Resilience of Global Supply Chains in an Era of Geopolitical and Climate Disruptions—is both an interesting and complex one. We do hope that you are thorough with the research and with an open mind while entering the committee.

As you prepare for committee, understand your country's role in global supply chains and the interests that shape its policies. Familiarize yourself with key international institutions, trade networks, and the challenges posed by geopolitical tensions and climate disruptions. The best debates will balance national priorities with international cooperation to develop realistic and implementable solutions.

During sessions, the dais expects respectful, substantive debate. Come with your position paper ready, your arguments well-structured, and a willingness to collaborate on resolutions that go beyond the immediate future.

We look forward to an engaging committee

Regards,

Siva Kothe	Ayaan Hussain Khan	Vidhi Shukla
Chairperson	Co-chairperson	Rappotuer

Rules of Procedure

In this committee, we will be following an altered version of UNA-USA ROP for the purpose of understanding and simulation. An elaborate version of this will be explained within the first committee session on Day 1.

TYPES OF DEBATE

Formal Debate:

General Speakers list: A general speakers list consists of speakers willing to speak on the agenda.GSL is an inexhaustive list that only ends when the debate is tables and no further are speeches are being made by any speaker.

Verbatim: *"The delegate of X raises a motion to establish General Speakers list of individual speaker's time X minutes/seconds."*

Special Speakers list: A special speakers list consists of speakers willing to speak on the crisis updates. An SSL can be raised when a crisis update is given and if the committee believes special emphasis is required to speak upon it.

Verbatim: *"The delegate of X raises a motion to suspend the general speakers list and establish a special speakers list for individual speaker's time X minutes/seconds and a total time period of X minutes".*

Note: The total time period must be divisible by the individual speaker's time to give out a whole number of speakers.

Informal Debate:

Unmoderated Caucus: An unmoderated caucus is raised for an informal, unmoderated discussion on the committee's proceedings.

Verbatim: *"The delegate of X raises a motion to suspend formal debate and move into an unmoderated caucus for a total time period of X minutes."*

Consultation Session: A consultation session is an informal discussion on the committee's proceedings where one delegate stands up after another to make their speeches without recognition.

Verbatim: *"The delegate of X would like to suspend formal debate and move into a consultation session for a total time period of X minutes."*

POINTS

1. Point of Personal Privilege: Can be raised when a delegate faces any personal discomfort. For example, if the air conditioner feels too cold, etc.

2. Point of Parliamentary Inquiry: Can be raised at any given time that a delegate wants to ask a query to the executive board.

3. Point of Information: Can be raised if you have a question on another delegate's speech.

4. Point of Order: Raised when another delegate makes a factual inaccuracy in their speech.

Verbatim: *"The delegate of X said, and I quote, [factual inaccuracy], and the correct statement is [correction]."*

Please note: Points cannot be raised on other points. Points cannot be raised during informal debate.

YIELDS

1. Yield to Another Delegate: In formal debate, if a delegate does not elapse their

time, the remaining time can be yielded to another delegate for them to speak. They must be informed prior to accept the yield.

2. Yield to Executive Board: Upon a delegate not elapsing their time, their

The remaining time can be yielded back to the executive board to either accept questions or move on to the next speaker, at the board's discretion.

3. Yield to POI: Upon a delegate not elapsing their time, they can yield their time to a point of information, where another delegate can pose questions related to their speech.

Section 1: Introduction to ECOSOC

The United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) is the UN's principal organ for economic and social cooperation and development. Established by the UN Charter in 1945, ECOSOC coordinates the economic, social, and related work of over 70% of the UN's programmes and funds. Its broad mandate, drawn from Articles 61–72 of the UN Charter, includes promoting higher living standards, full employment, human rights, and solutions to global economic, social, health, and cultural problems. In practice, ECOSOC provides policy guidance and policy recommendations on international development and sustainability issues, supports the implementation of international development goals, and hosts discussions on emerging global challenges.

ECOSOC comprises 54 member states, elected by the General Assembly for staggered three-year terms. Seats are allocated by geographic distribution (Africa, Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin America/Caribbean, Western Europe/Others). Each member has one vote; decisions and recommendations are adopted by a simple majority of those present and voting. ECOSOC meets annually (often mid-year) to conduct plenary debate, but much of its work is done through specialized commissions and committees (e.g. on statistics, development finance, social development), which in turn advise ECOSOC or other UN bodies.

As a deliberative and coordinating body, ECOSOC's powers are limited: its resolutions are non-binding recommendations for member states and UN agencies, and it cannot enforce policies by itself. Instead, ECOSOC relies on consensus-building and dialogue. Its strength lies in convening diverse stakeholders – governments, international organizations, private sector and civil society – around shared development objectives. For example, ECOSOC grants consultative status to NGOs, allowing civil society input into its debates. Over the past decade, UNGA reforms (Res. 72/305, 75/290A/B) have bolstered ECOSOC's role in driving the 2030 Agenda and integrating economic, social and environmental policy priorities.

This agenda on supply chain resilience is well suited to ECOSOC. Supply chains are core components of the global economy and development. Disruptions to trade and logistics have direct economic, social and environmental implications (e.g. food security, energy access, climate adaptation). By focusing on "resilience" to geopolitical and climate disruptions, the topic spans ECOSOC's remit of economic development, social welfare, and sustainable development. ECOSOC's convening power makes it an ideal venue to develop broad, cooperative strategies: for instance, bringing together governments, UN agencies like UNCTAD and WTO, as well as

private sector and NGOs, to forge consensus on strengthening global supply chains. In short, ECOSOC's integrative mandate aligns directly with crafting policy responses to ensure that global development and humanitarian goals can withstand the shocks to international trade and commerce.

2. Global Supply Chains

Definition: A global supply chain (often called a global value chain) is the network of producers, suppliers, transporters, warehouses, traders and retailers that move products from raw materials to final consumers. In other words, it is a "complex web connecting manufacturers, exporters, importers, rail, truck and ocean transport providers". For example, a smart phone supply chain may start with mined metals (critical minerals), components manufactured in Asia (chips from Taiwan/Korea, assembly in China), shipping of finished phones worldwide, and retail stores in multiple continents. Similarly, a global food chain might begin with grain grown in Argentina, shipped via the Panama Canal to feed mills in Europe, then redistributed as flour and packaged foods globally.

Key Sectors:

Maritime shipping: By volume, ~80% of international trade moves by sea (90% of trade in many studies). Cargo ships carry containerized goods, bulk commodities (coal, grain), oil and gas tankers. Key routes include the Strait of Malacca, Panama Canal, Suez Canal, and Gulf chokepoints (Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb). Ports and canals are vital nodes. A blockage (as seen when the Suez Canal closed in 2021) can halt hundreds of ships. As [20] notes, sea shipping is "the arteries of the global economy."

Energy: Oil and gas have dedicated supply chains of pipelines and tankers. For example, roughly one-fifth of world oil (about 20% of consumption) flows through the Strait of Hormuz. Oil also moves from Russia via pipelines (e.g. Druzhba pipeline) and via Arctic shipping. LNG (liquefied natural gas) supply relies on liquefaction plants, tankers, and regasification ports. Disruptions in energy chains quickly raise global fuel prices and can cause shortages (noted in 2022–26).

Agriculture/Food: Staples like wheat, rice, corn, and fertilizers are traded internationally. A significant portion of cereals and edible oils is exported (often >50% of production is traded). Food chains involve farms, processing plants, refrigerated shipping, and retail distribution. For example, much of the world's wheat from the Black Sea and Americas is shipped to bread-consuming regions. When conflicts or weather hit farmers or ports (e.g. the 2022 Ukraine war's impact on grain), global food prices and security suffer.

Semiconductors (High-Tech): Chipmaking is highly globalized and specialized. The semiconductor value chain spans front-end fabrication (mostly in Taiwan, South Korea), back-end packaging and testing (often in China/Malaysia), and design/IP (USA, Europe, Japan). According to industry analysis, the chain's stages (R&D/design → wafer fabrication → assembly/testing) are distributed worldwide. This concentration means any disruption (e.g. factory fire, export ban) can bottleneck electronics production.

Critical Minerals: Advanced industries rely on rare earths, lithium, cobalt, and other minerals. China currently dominates processing of many such minerals (e.g. ~85–90% of rare earth refining), even when mining is elsewhere. For instance, in 2019 China mined ~63% of rare earths but processed ~90% of them. Thus, if politics or disasters hit these supply chains, global tech (batteries, electronics, green tech) can be sharply impacted.

Digital/Logistics Services: The information backbone of trade – port management software, satellite tracking, e-commerce platforms and digital documentation – is also a "chain" of services. Much of trade documentation (invoices, bills of lading) is moving to electronic platforms. Disruption of digital links (e.g. cyberattacks, undersea cable cuts) can impair the entire physical flow. (Section 3 below discusses such cyber risks.)

3. Major Disruptions to Global Supply Chains

Global supply chains face threats from geopolitical conflict, climate extremes, cyberattacks, pandemics, and trade/sanctions measures. Below are key examples relevant to "the present," including the timeline in the Middle East, climate-related shocks, and other recent events.

Geopolitical Conflicts: Since early 2026, a regional conflict in the Persian Gulf has driven a spike in supply chain risk. Iran closed off the Strait of Hormuz (through which ~20–25% of global seaborne oil passes) and attacked shipping. On 17 June 2026, a U.S.-brokered "Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding" (14-point interim pact) was signed to reopen the strait and halt strikes. As one news analysis reports: "Iran and the United States agreed…to halt hostilities…and stand down so vessels can move freely". (However, as of 23 June, implementation was uncertain and some attacks were still reported.) The sudden closure of Hormuz caused a sharp rise in oil prices (Brent jumped above $90) and threatened fertilizer supplies (since much gas for fertilizer also transits the Gulf). Figure 1 shows how ship traffic through Hormuz collapsed as the conflict escalated:
Figure 1: Daily count of ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz (Feb–June 2026). The sharp drop reflects Iran's closure of the channel during the crisis.

Other conflicts also disrupt trade. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine forced closure of major Black Sea ports, halting grain, fertilizer and coal exports. For example, Ethiopia (which had relied on Ukraine/Russia for 45% of its wheat imports) saw those flows collapse by 75–100%

and had to scramble for new suppliers. Regional wars and tensions (e.g. blockades, sanctions on shipping lines) can similarly reroute or choke supplies.

Climate and Natural Hazards: Extreme weather and disasters are increasingly frequent stressors. Examples from recent years illustrate the variety:

Winter Storms: In Feb 2021, a major Arctic freeze in Texas led to widespread power blackouts. Three large semiconductor fabs in Texas went offline, exacerbating an already-tight chip market. Rail lines were shut, delaying chemicals and food shipments.
River Droughts: In 2022, Europe's Rhine River fell to record lows, halving barge capacity for coal, petrochemicals and grain. One report noted manufacturers on the Rhine had to load ships at half capacity due to low water, causing shortages and price spikes.
Floods: In July 2023, floods in central China forced closure of highways and ports, interrupting coal, pig, and auto supply chains. In late 2023, unprecedented flooding in Malaysia (from a typhoon and atmospheric rivers) inundated Port Klang, the second-busiest in SE Asia. Since many Taiwanese chips are sent to Klang for packaging, the port outage "arguably the worst flooding in history" created a new bottleneck in the global chip supply.
Wildfires: In summer 2023, a historic heatwave caused massive wildfires and flooding in British Columbia (Canada). Key rail lines (the Fraser Canyon corridor) were closed for months, stranding thousands of freight cars. Lumber, paper, and coal shipments were disrupted, causing shortages as far south as the U.S. west coast.
Hurricanes: Each year, tropical cyclones threaten supply hubs. For instance, Hurricane Ida (2021) struck the Gulf of Mexico, damaging petrochemical plants and rerouting freight; dozens of other storms have repeatedly shut ports along U.S. and Caribbean coasts.
Experts warn these events are just the start. Climate change means rising seas will eventually threaten nearly all 2,700+ global coastal ports (most only feet above sea level). Even now, storm surges and periodic flooding can cause multi-day port closures. The cumulative effect is higher insurance costs, rerouting via longer paths (increasing emissions), and stress on food/energy supply.

Cybersecurity and Digital Risks: Supply chains rely heavily on IT systems (port management, customs, inventories). Major cyberattacks have shown how a virus can ripple through commerce. In June 2017, the NotPetya malware (originating in Ukraine) hit the Danish shipping giant A.P. Moller-Maersk, paralyzing terminals in the USA, India, Europe and disrupting operations worldwide. As Reuters reported, several port terminals could not unload or receive containers, and Maersk's global IT systems went offline for days. That single cyberattack, dubbed among "the biggest-ever disruptions to hit global shipping", left many shippers "not knowing where any of their cargoes or containers are." More recently, ransomware groups have targeted logistics firms and port infrastructure in attacks that block manifest systems or GPS. Such incidents force companies to "go back to basics" (paper logs and manual checks) and introduce costly delays.

Cyberattacks in finance (e.g. SWIFT systems) or in control systems (e.g. targeting automated cranes) could similarly stall flows. This risk is growing: 87% of surveyed shipping companies in 2017 expected cyber threats to rise.

Pandemics and Biological Hazards: The COVID-19 crisis (2020–2022) was an unparalleled shock. Lockdowns in China (the world's factory) and port closures worldwide disrupted manufacturing and trade. Global trade volume plunged by 13–32% in 2020, according to WTO estimates. Products from electronics to garments saw severe delays. At the height of the pandemic, air cargo capacity fell by 50% (as passenger flights grounded) and ocean freight suffered container shortages. Medical supply chains (masks, PPE, vaccines) were acutely tested; some nations imposed export bans on medicines. Although trade rebounded strongly after 2020, the pandemic highlighted vulnerabilities in just-in-time sourcing and dependency on single nations for critical goods (e.g. active pharmaceutical ingredients).

Trade Measures and Export Controls: In peacetime, governments may impose export controls, tariffs or quotas that fragment supply chains. Recent examples: In 2025–2026 the U.S. further tightened export controls on advanced semiconductors. In May 2026 the Commerce Department closed a loophole that had allowed cutting-edge AI chips (e.g. Nvidia Blackwell) to reach Chinese tech firms' overseas units. China responded in kind: in June 2026 Beijing added US rare-earth and defense-related firms to its export control lists. These tit-for-tat measures can freeze flows of key components (chips, minerals) and prompt companies to stockpile or relocate production. Trade sanctions (e.g. on Russia, Iran, or Myanmar) similarly force buyers to find alternative sources, raising costs and causing shortfalls (e.g. current sanctions on Russian fertilizers have tightened world grain markets). Such measures add layers of complexity that global chains must navigate.

4. Existing International Frameworks

Many UN and multilateral mechanisms touch on aspects of supply chain resilience. Below we list major ones, noting their mandates, relevance, and limitations in this context.

United Nations System (General): The UN Charter (Chapter X) delegates ECOSOC broad coordination of economic and social fields. UN bodies (GA, ECOSOC, and Secretariat agencies) adopt resolutions urging member states to strengthen trade facilitation, invest in infrastructure, and prepare for disasters. The UN's own development goals (see SDGs) integrate resilience. However, the UN system has no central authority to enforce cross-border logistics rules. Its role is mainly to convene dialogue, share best practices, and mobilize cooperation. For example, UNGA or ECOSOC resolutions may call for safer shipping lanes or climate action, but rely on states and treaties for follow-through.

UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): UNCTAD is a UN body under ECOSOC founded in 1964 to "formulate policies relating to all aspects of development, including trade, aid, transport, finance and technology". It provides research and technical assistance on trade logistics and infrastructure, especially for developing countries. UNCTAD's Review of Maritime Transport tracks shipping trends, and its Global Supply Chain Forum convenes leaders on trade challenges. It also runs ASYCUDA (customs data system) to streamline ports. UNCTAD can highlight vulnerabilities and advise states, but cannot compel action. Its major limitation is political: it depends on consensus of its 195 members, and its policy prescriptions (e.g. for diversification or investment) require national implementation. UNCTAD has called explicitly for more resilient and sustainable trade systems but has no hard power.

World Trade Organization (WTO): The WTO administers most multilateral trade rules (tariffs, quotas, etc.). Its core mandate is to liberalize and standardize trade, thereby fostering an "open, predictable trading system". A strong multilateral system, as WTO economists argue, provides "flexicurity" by allowing countries to shift suppliers quickly when shortages hit. The WTO also has committees on trade facilitation and, informally, on supply-chain issues. For example, members have debated measures like e-customs and trade data sharing to reduce delays. WTO agreements can thus facilitate supply flows. However, WTO's limitations are significant: it cannot deal with climate or security issues directly, and its dispute settlement mainly handles tariffs not emergencies. In a crisis, a country might invoke exceptions (e.g. GATT Article XX for security) or simply bypass WTO norms. Moreover, the WTO's consensus-driven nature makes rapid new rules (like emergency stockpile rules) difficult. In essence, WTO helps by reducing trade barriers and ensuring alternative suppliers are available, but it is not an emergency response agency.

International Maritime Organization (IMO): The IMO is the UN's specialized agency for shipping, ensuring "safety, security and environmental performance" of maritime transport. Its conventions (SOLAS for safety, MARPOL for pollution, etc.) set minimum standards for ships and ports. IMO also works on efficiency (e.g. reducing port congestion through standardized procedures, such as via the FAL Convention). Recently, IMO has begun addressing climate (e.g. decarbonization of shipping) and has a new mandate for cyber risk management on ships. These efforts indirectly enhance resilience by making ships and ports safer from accidents or cyber-intrusions. Limitations: IMO cannot prevent deliberate blockades or enforce speedier cargo clearance – that's up to governments. IMO's focus is technical and voluntary compliance (some conventions still lack universal ratification). But as the shipping sector's rule-maker, IMO is a key forum for any proposal affecting sea transport (like mandatory resilience audits or green corridors).

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, UNGA 2015): The 2030 Agenda includes several goals relevant to resilient supply chains. SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure) explicitly calls for building "resilient infrastructure" and "sustainable industrialization," which covers ports, roads, and ICT networks. SDG 13 (Climate Action) urges integration of climate measures into policy (relevant to ports and agriculture). SDG 2 (Zero Hunger) and SDG 17 (Partnerships) also speak to food security and multi-stakeholder collaboration. The SDGs are universal commitments; many UN programs (FAO for food, UNDP for disaster risk) work under this umbrella. However, SDGs are not legally binding. They serve as guiding targets but require national plans. If delegates propose solutions (like an international supply reserve), they can align them to SDGs to gain political traction, but enforcement is through states' own development policies.

Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030): Agreed in 2015 under UNDRR, the Sendai Framework explicitly recognizes supply chain resilience as part of disaster risk management. It expands DRR to include technological and biological hazards (not just natural disasters). Sendai calls for early warning systems, resilient infrastructure, and public-private collaboration – all applicable to supply chains. In practice, UNDRR encourages governments and businesses to conduct risk assessments for critical supply routes (ports, bridges, ICT). The framework's limitations: it is voluntary and broad; it has no dedicated funding for, say, port reinforcements. It also assumes nations will integrate its principles into national DRR strategies. Not every country or company has done so, so supply-chain-specific strategies (e.g. alternative routing) are still ad-hoc.

Aid for Trade Initiative: Launched at the WTO's 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, Aid for Trade is a major program (OECD data shows ~$43 billion disbursed in 2017) that helps developing countries improve trade-related infrastructure and capacity. It is not a single fund but a commitment by donors to target trade bottlenecks. Activities under AfT include building roads, modernizing customs, digitizing ports (e.g. supporting UNCTAD's ASYCUDA rollouts) – all of which strengthen supply chains. The initiative's relevance is high: by funding transport/logistics projects, Aid for Trade can make chains more efficient and less prone to local delays. Its limitation is that it is donor-driven and not specific to "resilience." Donors prioritize a wide range of projects, and actual impact on chain resilience depends on national planning. Also, Aid for Trade is voluntary: there is no enforcement to ensure promised funds are delivered or used optimally.

World Customs Organization (WCO): The WCO (an independent body of customs administrations) focuses on secure and efficient border processing of goods. It created the SAFE Framework and new guidelines on supply chain security and integrity. For instance, WCO's 2025 Supply Chain Integrity guidance helps customs identify emerging threats and close regulatory gaps. By promoting standards for data exchange (like the UN's "Single Window"

concept) and by fighting illicit trade, WCO contributes to smoother flow at borders. Its limitation: WCO can advise and train customs, but border delays still depend on national policies and staffing. Also, WCO's anti-smuggling focus may not directly address climate or health-related disruptions, though efforts are expanding (e.g. to pandemics and natural disasters in its continuity guidelines).

Other Relevant Instruments: UNIDO's trade facilitation programs, UNDRR's private-sector alliance (ARISE), the International Chamber of Shipping's and port authorities' coalitions, and regional entities (ASEAN, EU) also have roles. For example, at the UN level, the Global Platform on Disaster Risk Reduction often holds sessions on supply chain topics. The Sendai voluntary commitments include several by private sector organizations in logistics, acknowledging supply-chain risks. The UN Global Logistics Cluster (coordinated by WFP) ensures humanitarian corridors in crises, but its mandate is mainly for emergencies, not commercial trade.

5. Questions a Resolution Must Answer (QARMA)

How can UN/Member States strengthen supply chain resilience to geopolitical conflict? (e.g. ensure open lanes, emergency energy corridors, multinational patrols, or crisis talks mechanism)

How can trade diversification be encouraged? (e.g. support developing country exporters, stockpiles of critical goods, redundant routing, regional trade agreements to broaden sources)

What measures ensure climate resilience of transport infrastructure? (e.g. climate-proof ports, alternate routes, insurance schemes, early warning systems for disasters affecting supply nodes)

How to integrate private sector and public institutions? (e.g. public-private partnerships, resilience standards for companies, information-sharing platforms among governments and businesses)

What role for financial/technical assistance? (e.g. funding via Aid-for-Trade or climate funds to upgrade logistics; capacity-building for customs and port management)

How to manage dual-use and export controls issues? (e.g. crisis-time easing of bans on medical/food supplies, transparency norms, monitoring to prevent abuse)

How to bolster cybersecurity of logistics? (e.g. cyber hygiene guidelines for ports and shipping, international rapid-response teams for IT incidents, capacity-building)

How to protect labor and social needs? (e.g. as containers backlog, ensuring workers' rights, avoiding exploitative practices, considering impact on food security)

What data/early-warning systems are needed? (e.g. international monitoring of chokepoints and inventories, real-time alerts, shared crisis simulations)

How to ensure equitable solutions? (e.g. assistance to small or vulnerable economies in building resilience; no unilateral measures that hurt poorest states)

How to incorporate sustainability? (e.g. green shipping corridors, low-carbon fuels, ensuring resilience initiatives align with SDGs)

What institutional mechanisms can coordinate responses? (e.g. new UN/ECOSOC working groups, integrated cluster for logistics, partnerships with WTO/IMO/UNDRR)